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MISCELLANEOUS
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INTRODUCTION
The essence of the 'new issues' raised by Respondent Department
of Commerce and Labor (DOL) are the same as raised by Appellant
Henderson. The rewording of the respective issues casts them in a light that
DOL believes is favorable to it. The results are the same regardless. This
Reply Brief will endeavor to avoid repetition of argument.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
DOL misstates a portion of the course below at pages 1 and 2 of
it's brief. It states that "Based upon new information she received, Ms.
Ackerman changed the Department's work search classification" and cites to
a portion of the Hearing transcript.
This is not a correct statement.
Ms. Ackerman did not change anything based upon 'new
information' she received. Pages 22 and 23 of the hearing transcript reflect
that it was a computer issue because of the changed program. She testified
that the way the computer system was "unfortunately" set up on the 'current
sequence' she was coded as a B2. She further explained that although the
computer listed Henderson as a B2 that in fact Henderson, in all 3 series is
considered to be job attached. The standard applicable to Henderson, as
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explained by Ms. Ackerman, in all three 3 claims, was and remained at all
times, 'job attached.'
Additionally, DOL states that the claimant changed her mailing
address from St. Maries to Hawaii. Respondent's Brief, p. 5. Actually as
explained by Ms. Ackerman, the actual change of address on the computer
was done by a staff member, for Henderson. Hr. T. p. 9, L. 12-16.
Finally it is inferred that Henderson 'redacted' information from
the Appendix. Respondent's Brief p. 5. 'Redacted' generally refers to
information blocked out by magic marker. The pages relevant to the appeal
were put in rather than inundating the Court with numerous pages of fire
starter.
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ARGUrnNT NO. 1
WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY HENDERSON'S NO. 2
ELIGIBILITY UNDER LC. SECTION 72-1366(4)(a)(b)
The statutory requirement established by the Legislature for
eligibility for unemployment benefits is set forth at I.C. section 72-1366 (4)
(a) and (b).
No where in subsections (a) andlor (b) is there any statement of
intent that a 'job attached' employee (or a non-attached employee) "must
remain at all times in their respective labor market area." Indeed the clear
and unequivocal requirement is not that a claimant must live in their
'respective labor market' but rather the requirement is that the person must
reside in a state that is included in the interstate benejitplan. There is no
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dispute that Hawaii is a state and that it is included in the interstate benefit
plan program.
DOL attempts to support the untenable position taken by Ms.
Ackerman the DOL representative at the hearing and the one involved in the
initiating of the process, that Henderson was 'not available for work,'
because she could not be at work in an hour or even the very next day. She
testified that her understanding of the requirement was,
"...available for work in an hour or even the very next day."
Hk. T. p. 11, L. 15-17.
The standard despite the DOL argument contrary to the express
wording of the statute is not that a person must sit by the telephone, with car
running, just in case the highly unlikely and improbable telephone call may
come and tell the 'attached' employee to be at work in an hour, or even the
very next day. Real life in 'seasonal' jobs does not work that way. Indeed the
only requirement, even under Ms. Ackerman's interpretation that Henderson
could not meet was to be at work in a hour. As Henderson testified, she could
have been back to be ready for work within 5 hours and certainly within 24
hours after her receipt of a telephone call. Hr. T. p. 14, L.4-5.

A standard that would require a 'seasonal' employee to be back at
work within an hour would be patently unreasonable. In the winter, the 'offseason' a person could not drive from St. Maries to Coeur d'Alene, let alone
Spokane, because it takes at least an hour-on a good day with clear roads to
travel back from Coeur dYAleneto St. Maries, let alone get work clothes on
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and then make it to the place of business or job site location. Certainly reason
must prevail at some point, and under the most extreme circumstances it is
not unreasonable to allow a 'seasonal' employee on 'lay-off at least 24
hours notice to allow them to get their affairs in order and be at work. Under
that reasonable requirement, Henderson is undisputedly qualified.
DOL attempts to support it's argument with two 'non-job attached'
cases (Claim of Sapp, 75 Idaho 65, 266 P.2d 1027 (1954) and Kirkbride v.
Department of Employment, 91 Idaho 658, 429 P.2d 390 (1967)). The

Industrial Commission, from whence this appeal arises, did not believe that
these two cases were relevant. If it had, it would not have reached out to
Florida and California for the cases it relied upon for support. Indeed, the
status of a 'job attached' employee is far different than the status of a 'nonattached' employee. This difference is steeped in sound public policy that
Idaho's seasonal employers must be able to count upon a returning skilled
workforce in order to compete in the marketplace.
At page 16 of it's brief, DOL, pulls the curtain back and reveals that
it's argument, and actually the position taken by the Industrial Commission,
is based simply on the fact that Henderson spent her 'lay-of? time as a 'job
attached' employee, in Hawaii.
As the DOL argued,
"Wintering in Hawaii is not the sort of compelling personal
circumstance for which the California Court or Idaho law
could make an allowance." Respondent's Brief, p. 16.
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As the Industrial Commission held,
"We note that no one forced Claimant to seek unemployment
benefits while she spent her winters in Hawaii. Claimant did
so on her own free will." R. p. 22.
Obviously, the state in which 'job attached' claimant lives during
the seasonal lay-off should have no impact on eligibility so long as the
person can return to work in a reasonable time frame, after notice to do so,
and so long as the state is an 'interstate' participant. Henderson's living in
Hawaii during the seasonal lay-off meets all of those requirements. Would
wintering in Northern Minnesota, North Dakota, or Northern Wisconsin be
more palatable from a personal circumstance point of view? These are all
states under I.C. section 72-1366(4) and their respective winters really put
the 'winter' into wintering. Should they be? Obviously, the answer to these
rhetorical questions should be no. So long as the person is 'job attached',
capable of returning to work within a reasonable time after notice, and living
in an 'interstate' state, the person should be entitled to the unemployment
benefits.
The facts are undisputed that Henderson was job attached, could
have and was ready to return to work upon very short and reasonable notice,
and was residing in an interstate benefit state. Henderson meets the
requirements of I.C. section 72-1366 (4) (a) and (b).
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REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT NO. I1
WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY HENDERSON'S ARGUMENT 4
REGARDING WAIVER UNDER I.C. SECTION 72-1369(5)(a)
DOL's argument regarding 'waiver' in response to Henderson's
reasonfor answering the reporting question in the manner in which she was
told is, essentially, as reflected at page 27, L. 15-17 of the Hr. T.,
"And I do want to say that as manager of the local office
we never instruct our claimant to falsifjr on a weekly report
when they file their claim."
Truth or falseness are not issues in this case. Both the Hearing
Examiner and the Industrial Commission found that Henderson's receipt of
unemployment benefit payments were "not the result of a false statement or
misrepresentation made by Claimant." T. p.6. If Henderson's reports were
not false nor misrepresentations then by definition they must have been true
and made with no intent to deceive or be unfair.
Henderson testified that she was told how to answer the question
by the DOL local representative when she notified them to change her
address for her from St. Maries to Hawaii. Henderson also testified that she
based her answer to the question upon what she thought that the question
meant. She answered the same question consistently the same for the same
reasons. Since it was a finding of act that Henderson did not make a 'false
statement or misrepresentation' it is likewise true, and consistent with Ms.
Ackerman's testimony, that she was not instructed by DOL staff to falsify
REPLY BRIEF OF HENDERSON

8

her answers on a report. Neither of the two, (1) what she was told to do
when answering, and (2) what she answered, are untrue, false or
misrepresentations.
Given the express finding that Henderson did not falsify or
misrepresent it is difficult to appreciate how she could be deemed at fault for
giving an answer that she felt was correct, that she has given consistently
over the years, and that she was told to give. It is also disconcerting, given
this finding of fact of no falsity or misrepresentation, that the Hearing
Examiner and the Industrial Commission by inference could adopt a position
that the "only accurate answer" that Henderson could have given was not the
one that she gave. Certainly if it were truly the " only " accurate answer
Henderson's giving of a different answer, such as she did, would be
falsifying or misrepresenting on it's face.
With regards to the Industrial Commission it wasn't a question of
credibility as DOL argues in its brief, at page 22. Rather the Industrial
Commission refused the waiver for the novel reason that Henderson went to
Hawaii. The Industrial Commission held on this point, "no one forced
Claimant to seek unemployment benefits while she spent her winters in
Hawaii. Claimant did so on her own ftee will. Therefore Claimant is entirely
responsible for the information she provided when she sought those
benefits." R. p. 22. The Industrial Commissions holding that Henderson
went to Hawaii while laid off makes any error solely of her own doing ,after
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Henderson reported her change of address to the DOL local office who
changed it for her on the computer, and when Henderson responded to the
weekly reporting questions in exactly the manner that she was told by the
local DOL representative to do, is untenable. There is no showing how
Henderson going to Hawaii makes her culpable for any perceived wrong
answer especially in light of the undisputed facts of this case. Indeed, while
Ms. Ackerman the local manager testified that her office does not instruct
claimants to falsify reports, the fact is that the DOL could have produced the
person who changed Henderson's address on the computer and told her how
to fill out the weekly reporting form, but it failed to do so and failed to
contradict Henderson's testimony, which given the finding of no falsity or
misrepresentation is not rebutted.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT I11
WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY HENDERSON'S
ARGUMENT 1-JURISDICTION
The Court will consider a question of jurisdiction on appeal. The
statutory requirements governing appeals are mandatory and jurisdictional.
Lujkin v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 584, 602 P.2d 947 (1979);
Dunlap v. Cassia Memorial Hospital Medical Center, 134 Idaho 233, 999
P.2d 888 (2000).
DOL argues that either (1) no determination of eligibility was ever
made on Henderson's unemployment claims for December 12,2004 through
February 26,2005 or December 4,2005 through April 1,2006, during which
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Henderson received unemployment benefits, or (2) that each weekly report
results in a new determination and is a new event that triggers a new appeal
time or statute of limitations. It is difficult to conceive that no determination
of eligibility was ever made on Henderson's claims during these two periods
of time, although payments were made to her, and that a 'determination' can
be made without the presence of a non-disclosure or a misrepresentation at

any subsequent time.
Nonetheless, even under DOL's argument the March 30,2007
'determination' with regards to the weekly claim reporting periods of
December 12,2004 through February 26,2005 are all outside of the I.C.
section 72-1368(3), 14 day appeal time. They are also outside of the one (1)
year "special redetermination" (which by definition implies that a
determination has been already made) time period. With regards to the
weekly claim reporting periods from December 4,2005 through April 1,
2006, all weekly periods, except the last three of March 12ththrough March
31" are also outside the 14 day appeal period and outside the one (1) year
"special redetermination" period of time. Beyond these three week reporting
periods, under DOL's own argument there would be no jurisdiction in the
DOL or the Industrial Commission because there is no allegation, nor
finding, of nondisclosure nor misrepresentation involved. The DOL does use
terms in this argument, and elsewhere in it's brief, such as "failed to report
accurately" and "answers to this question were inaccurate." However the
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express finding of fact by the Hearings Examiner and adopted by the
Industrial Commission was that the "overpayment was not the result of a
false statement or misrepresentation made by claimant." R. p. 6.
At most, even under DOL's proposed analysis, only three (3) weeks
of benefits in the total amount of $975.00 would be at issue on this appeal.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT IV
WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY HENDERSON'S
ARGUMENT 3-IDAPA
The gravaman of the issue raised by Henderson during the entire
length of her pro se, and now represented, journey through this nightmare she
tried so hard to avoid, is the question of her entitlement to unemployment
benefits pursuant to I.C. section 72-1366(4)(a) and (b). The validity of
IDAPA 09.0 1.30.175.04.23 is inherently a part of that question. The Court
will no more enforce an illegal transaction than it will enforce a regulation
that in effect rewrites a clear and unambiguous statute. Moses v. Idaho State

Tax Commission, 118 Idaho 676, 799 P.2d 964 (1990). The validity of the
IDAPA rule was raised by Henderson's responses to DOL's action below and
her appeal to the Industrial Commission which placed the rule squarely at
issue.
I.C. section 72-1366(4)(b) clearly and unequivocally provides that
she must (and) live in a state that is included in the interstate benefit plan.
There is no dispute that Hawaii is such a state and indeed that is how
Henderson processed her last claims was through that plan. Subsection (b)
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makes no mention whatsoever about any requirement that a claimant live in
the state of Idaho, let alone the even more restrictive "local labor market."
The statute clearly uses the wording "a state".
DOL argues that the 'intent' is to require that a person be
"genuinely attached to a labor market," and that IDAPA 09.01.30.175.23 is
the DOL7sattempt to insure that attachment. What this argument does not
take into account is the undisputed finding of fact that Henderson was
classified as '"jb attached" to her respective specific employer, and returned
to her respective "attached" employer each and every time. R. p. 2-3.
It is difficult to conceive of how a person could be more "attached
to a labor market" than to be a "job attached" employee who returns
regularly each year to the respective employer. IDAPA may be a good faith
effort to insure that "non-job attached" workers remain genuinely attached to
the labor market, but that intent can not run afoul of the clear statutory
language and, in Henderson's specific situation, the undisputed finding of
fact of her strong attachment to the labor market as a "job attached" worker,
who only needs to remain in contact with hisher respective and specific
employer.
Henderson was "attached" as closely to her labor market at all times
as any unemployed worker could possibly be as a "job attached" employee,
and she lived at all times in "a state....that is included in the interstate benefit
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payment plan." Henderson not only meets the letter of the law but the intent
of the law.
CONCLUSION

The DOL's arguments, if anything, serve to strength and galvanize
the position of Henderson that she at all times fully complied with statutory
requirements to receive unemployment benefits. Her situation represents the
practicalities of the inherent need of Idaho's many seasonal employers to
maintain a skilled workforce and the practicalities of a "job attached"
employee. Henderson's consistent history of seasonal lay-off and then return
to work to the respective "job attached" employer when called and her ability
to return to that respective employer on the most minimal of reasonable
notice are reflective that the system as designed by the Idaho Legislature
works as it was intended. The Court should reverse the Decision of the
Industrial Commission.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMJJXED,
n
this &day

of March, 2008.

Starr Kelso, Attorney for Appellant Henderson

REPLY BFUEF OF ENDERSON

14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this &day of March, 2008,I caused to be
served two true and correct copies of the foregoing by First Class Postage via
the United States Post Office to
Tracey K. Rolfsen
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor
3 17 Main Street
Boise, Idaho
,-83735
F,

Starr Kelso
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